

The Military Factor in Zimbabwe's Political and Electoral Affairs

“Our demand is just and legitimate. We demand a free and fair election where international observers will oversee.” (1978), Josiah Tongogara, Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) Commander.

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By Dr. Martin Rupiya

In Zimbabwe's dynamic political and electoral affairs since 2000, it is difficult to see the wood for the trees as it relates to the role of the military? And yet, we must remain clear, the use of violence--manifest through the role of the military in politics -- is but a reflection of the dominance of an aggressive faction within ZANU (PF), one that has always had the propensity to kill, maim and torture political opponents and is now able to do so using armed state organs. As we write, this faction is galvanized to extremes, shorn of all semblance of political rationality, spurred by the obvious failing health of the First Secretary and President against the background of fiercely contested, internal, political succession issue within the party.

The excellent research undertaken here, carefully documenting incidents and personalities associated with the violence strategy within a post-colonial Zimbabwe has to be located within the broader political survival struggle of a former liberation movement that has now lost electoral mass appeal. There are at least two historical epochs, over the last 30 years, during which evidence of the aggressive faction's willingness to destroy political opponents had registered itself, only to be quickly reigned in. The first period was against the Ndebele, as well as designed to destroy ZAPU the political party and former ZIPRA forces. This period, from the early 1980s until 1988, witnessed separate armed and partisan elements created and used outside the emerging and integrating conventional Zimbabwe National Army.¹ Later acknowledged by President Robert Mugabe as "moment of madness" the period witnessed the deployment of a highly partisan Zimbabwe People's Militia (ZPM), the Korean trained 5th Brigade and the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) all with a command and control chain that was separate from the conventional force.

The second period for the dominant aggressive faction to show its fangs was in 2000. This followed the then Army Spokesperson, Major Chancellor Diye who, before the tight Parliamentary Elections of June 2000, announced that the Military was apolitical and would support any victor emerging from the electoral context. This was the last time this type of message was to be heard.

On 9th January 2002, led by the late Chief of Defence Staff Lieutenant General Vitalis Zvinvashe, the service chiefs pledged exclusive allegiance to President R. Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The barely defeated ZANU-PF, only returned to office with a wafer thin 5 seat majority, publicly declared the establishment of a War Cabinet, peopled by "Amadoda Sibili" and whose war mongering objectives were to be implemented by a security sector with a defined role and of course, after the necessary "purification" with the political opposition now transmuted to represent "the face of the enemy."

¹ See *Breaking the Silence Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland & Midlands 1980-1989*, compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation, September 2001.

This development has remained true to this day: where the partisan military is discharging a political role, holding the ring—bludgeoning any perceived or actual political opponents and thereby denying any political aspirants through the elections, the opportunity. Meanwhile, ZANU (PF) continues to desperately re-organize itself to wrest political power and legitimacy. For example, in 2005, *Operation Murambatsvina* uprooted an estimated 700 000 families or 2.4 million people, a further flitting moment, showing us the propensity for callousness of this mendacious group.² Again further and similar events were quickly culled from the cacophony of local and international criticism that emerged.

The major electoral and political beneficiary from the critical constituencies of rural folk, the unemployed, struggling workers, students, intellectuals and urban communities is the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) whose manifesto promises non-violence, tolerance and consultation in adopting people-centred policies—something that resulted in sweeping victories at local government, national assembly and even presidential vote in March 2008.

By 2008, after the unprecedented socio-economic collapse that further saw the deployment of the military in the strategic areas of the economy, the opportunity for divesting the politics away from the militarization appeared remote. Significantly, as this research demonstrates, the Electoral Commission and associated stages such as delimitation; voter registration, voter education, campaigning, manning the command centre and electoral results announcements were all facets in the hands of the military, whose purpose and objectives are driven by one of the contestants: ZANU-PF.

Bereft of any political legitimacy and forced to go into negotiations that resulted in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed in September 2008, ZANU-PF factions appeared to have been mollified by the rejection of the voters and the intervention of the SADC and the AU, forcing the party to make concessions and accept a Transitional arrangement within a coalition government with the MDC formations. Two years into the coalition government, even after admitting major areas of security sector reform as captured in the GPA, the internal dynamics of diminishing day-to-day influence, president Mugabe's poor health and slipping grip on power of the political party under SADC facilitation, the aggressive faction appears now convinced the time has come to wreck the coalition agreement and impose itself on the citizenry of Zimbabwe through the so-called elections where the winner has already been declared.

However, what this preface has sought to argue: is that, we need to see the wood for the trees—the military is but a pawn of a political faction—imbued with aggression and with a history of seeking to destroy political opponents, even within ZANU-PF. Hence, the current events do not reflect a universal position within ZANU-PF. Other moderates quite rightly see the folly of this option but remain frozen as the First Secretary and President of the Party remains wedded to the

² See *Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope & Impact of Operation Murambatsvina* by UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements in Zimbabwe, Mrs Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, 18 July 2005, at ww2.unhabitat.org/documents/ZimbambweReport.pdf; see also *Operation Murambatsvina "An Overview & Summary"* *Sokwanele* at <http://www.sokwanele.com>, accessed 02 June 2011.

tool of violence and abuse of opponents in an environment characterized by an absence of the rule of law, unreformed Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information & Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the security sector enjoying impunity for any human rights excesses. Furthermore, the option of visiting violence on citizens appears at variance with the global values and especially the North African norm that has witnessed a rapid rapprochement between the military and citizens in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and Libya.

1. Summary

Since Zimbabwe's attainment of independence from colonial rule in 1980, the security sector, particularly the military, has played a significant role in the political and electoral affairs of the country. The visibility and influence of the military rose gradually over the years to the current position of dominance and de facto veto power over Zimbabwe's civilian affairs.

From the 1985 national elections where the military featured prominently in the violence against Zimbabwe African People's Party (ZAPU) supporters, Zimbabwe's electoral processes have been militarized and subject to interference by a military partisan towards the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). It is this toxic role of the security sector in the electoral environment and the administration of elections that must be addressed urgently if Zimbabwe is to create an environment conducive to holding credible, free and fair elections that are without violence or intimidation.

Zimbabwe's political transition has been dogged by the partisan role of the military and other security services. This report provides empirical evidence of the omnipresent, partisan and politicized nature of the military in the socio-political governance of the country and how this toxic role is blocking Zimbabwe's democratic political transition. The use of the military to unleash terror in the electorate is Clausewitzian—it is aimed to deliver the political objective of keeping ZANU-PF in power and therefore the violence strategy is not random, it has a specific purpose. This report presents blatant political and partisan statements made by senior military officials to prove their compromised standing and their unholy alliance with ZANU-PF in blocking the country's democratic transition.

Over the years, in line with an elaborate patronage system, the previous ZANU-PF government controlled by president Mugabe systematically deployed military personnel to strategic positions in various state institutions responsible for governance such as the judiciary, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), the Delimitation Commission, local government institutions, and state-controlled companies such as the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM). As a result, the military is deeply entrenched in the economy making their economic interests just as powerful as their fears for accountability for human right abuses.

It is unacceptable in a democracy to politicize the military, as it is to militarize political and civilian affairs and institutions. While the political leadership of the military is overtly partisan towards ZANU-PF, many soldiers in the rank and file are professional and non-partisan, aspiring to faithfully serve their country. It is a classical proverbial case of a fish with a rotting head. This report established that major challenges of partisanship and political interference are with the military leadership and not with the bulk of the low ranking members.

The Military Factor in Zimbabwe's Political and Electoral Affairs report gives recommendations on how the security sector, especially the military, can be subjected to civilian control and oversight to prevent it from subverting the will of the voters in the next elections. This report examines the role of the army in political processes such as political party campaigns, involvement of soldiers in politically-motivated violence and their extremely partisan and entrenched role in the administration of the economic affairs of the State.

At a minimum, the security sector - comprising the military, the police, the prison services and the central intelligence agency – must disentangle and completely separate itself from partisan politics and interference in the country's political and electoral affairs. Utterances by the military leadership that they will not salute any one without liberation credentials, which amount to pre-emptive coups in support of ZANU-PF, such as those made in 2002, 2008 and 2011, do not augur well for democracy and must cease to enable ordinary Zimbabweans to vote freely and have their vote count.

If Zimbabwe is to genuinely prepare for fresh elections that are free and fair, and where violence or intimidation play no part, then reform and transformation of the military and other security sector branches is of paramount importance. The power-sharing government of Zimbabwe and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) must urgently engage the military with a view to restore professionalism, independence and non-partisanship to the military and to completely divorce the military from all political interference.

2. Research Methodology

This report is based on Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition research conducted between September 2010 and March 2011. The research included interviews with various policy makers, serving and retired members of the military establishment, and officials in the inclusive government, security sector experts, civil society officials and ordinary Zimbabweans. Desktop research was used to gather data.

Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition also reviewed various reports on the military by both local and international civil society organizations, including Zimbabwe Peace Project, Zimbabwe Election Support Network, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, media reports and other material on the subject of military involvement in political and electoral affairs.

Names of key informants consulted in the compilation of this report have been withheld for security reasons.

Dr. Martin Rupiya, a security sector expert and former senior military officer in the Zimbabwe National Army, externally reviewed this report.

3. Background

3.1 *A gradual militarization and politicization of electoral institutions*

Elections are a critical aspect of democracy as they enable citizens to exercise their democratic right to choose who shall govern over them. They are important not only because they facilitate direct participation in the governance of the country by its citizens, but also because elections confer legitimacy – the legal right to govern and the political right to make decisions that may be applied.

Elections in Zimbabwe have become a mere concession to pressure to democratize, a gross form of lip-service to democracy characterized by the ZANU-PF regime's use of authoritarian tactics, violence and intimidation to coerce the electorate to support it. As demonstrated below, through the use of the military, ZANU-PF has perfected the art of taking citizens of Zimbabwe through periodic 'choice-less' elections where violence and intimidation play a decisive role in determining election processes and outcomes.

Zimbabwe's laws including the Defence Forces Act and the Constitution prohibit the military from participating in politics and from partisan interference in electoral affairs. The mission statement and objectives of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces clearly spell out what the army and other forces seek to achieve, which includes ensuring the protection and security of Zimbabwe's territorial integrity and independence. Notwithstanding the legal and formal prohibition of partisan political conduct by the army, the military leadership is openly partisan towards ZANU-PF and has dabbled in politics on several occasions thereby straining relations with civilians. Security sector expert Dr. Martin Rupiya³ notes that civil-military relations were eroded to being non-existent in 2002 when the military chiefs purported to set the criteria for persons who can be presidential candidates. Since 2002, the military has consistently threatened to veto any poll result that goes against its preferred candidate that is, Robert Mugabe.⁴

Over the past decade, Zimbabwe has witnessed a gradual militarization and politicization of electoral institutions characterized by several appointments of personnel with a military background to run institutions responsible for elections such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and the Delimitation Commission (DC).

In September 2004, President Robert Mugabe appointed a four-member Delimitation Commission chaired by former Judge Advocate responsible for military tribunals in the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and High Court Judge, Justice George Chiweshe. In 2008 Mugabe appointed Justice Chiweshe to chair the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission that presided over the violent and controversial 2008 national elections and the discredited 27 June presidential run-off election held the same year.

³ M. R. Rupiya, *Civil-Military Relations in Zimbabwe*

⁴ *The Security-military Business Complex and the Transition in Zimbabwe*, Zimbabwe Institute Discussion Paper: June 2008

Justice Chiweshe chaired ZEC from 2005 until 2010. In 2008 the Justice Chiweshe-led ZEC delayed the announcement of presidential results by more than six weeks for unclear reasons amid wide speculation that ZEC used the delay to manipulate figures to deny Morgan Tsvangirai an outright victory against Mugabe. In May 2010, Mugabe promoted Justice Chiweshe to Judge President, a move widely regarded as a reward for his partisan role at the helm of ZEC. This appointment triggered protests by the MDC and civic groups.

A member of the Chiweshe-led Delimitation Commission; Job Wabira is a former permanent secretary in the Ministry of Defence who in 1998 was accused of disregarding High Court rulings to release Standard newspaper journalists who had been arrested and tortured by the military for writing a story about an alleged coup attempt. Sobuza Gula-Ndebele, a former colonel in the ZNA was chairperson of the ESC charged with the running the 2002 presidential election. Gula-Ndebele was later appointed Attorney-General, a position he held until 2008.

During Gula-Ndebele's tenure at the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC), the Chief Executive Officer of the ESC was Brigadier-General Douglas Nyikayaramba who has since been appointed by President Mugabe to head 3 Brigade based in Manicaland. Brigadier Nyikayaramba recently went public saying he was ZANU PF and would not allow the victory of Prime Minister Tsvangirai. He noted that he would not salute Tsvangirai if he wins elections⁵. He further predicted a ZANU PF victory and demanded the elections be held in 2011, echoing the position of ZANU PF.

After the formation of the inclusive government ZEC was reconstituted with respected judge, Justice Simpson Mtambanengwe as its chairperson. Serious concerns remain, however, that the ZEC secretariat comprises of military personnel whose independence is questionable. For instance, a senior military official, Major Utuile Silaigwana, who was part of the 2008 ZEC circus, is ZEC spokesperson.

3.2 Direct military interference in electoral affairs – partisan public statements

Since February 2000, following the first electoral defeat to a ZANU-PF led government when people rejected a proposed constitutional draft, senior military officials have issued partisan public statements in support of President Mugabe and ZANU-PF and opposed to an election outcome that favors any party leader other than President Mugabe or his ZANU-PF nominee.

In March 2008 Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander, General Constantine Chiwenga signaled his readiness to set aside the constitution should Robert Mugabe be defeated at the polls, describing Mugabe's opponent, Morgan Tsvangirai as an agent of the West and vowing to instruct the military not to take orders from him.⁶ This was not the first time the military

⁵ The Zimbabwe Independent Newspaper, An Interview with Brigadier General Nyikayaramba, 27 May 2011

⁶ Chiwenga threatens coup if Mugabe loses election'. SW Radio Africa, 10 March 2008

leadership had vowed not to salute Tsvangirai. On 9 January 2002 all security chiefs publicly and jointly declared that they would not salute a president lacking “liberation credentials.”⁷

The former Commander of the Defence Forces General, the late Vitalis Zvinvashe issued a statement declaring that the country’s security sector would only support political leaders who “pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interest.”⁸ The statement continued:

To this end, let it be known that the highest office on the land is a ‘straightjacket’ whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people.⁹

Similarly, Brigadier-General Douglas Nyikayaramba told traditional chiefs, soldiers and the police at 3-3 infantry battalion in Mutare on October 23, 2010, that no person without revolutionary credentials would rule Zimbabwe. Nyikayaramba, a serving senior military official, publicly proclaimed his support for ZANU-PF saying, “*I am where I am today because of the party. Some of us actively participated in the struggle and we cannot stand up and say we do not belong to that party.*”¹⁰

More recently, on 27 May 2011, Brigadier-General Nyikayaramba told a weekly Zimbabwe paper that the military wants elections in 2011 which will be won by ZANU-PF adding, “*Truly speaking, I am in ZANU-PF and ZANU-PF is in me and you can’t change that.*”¹¹

In May 2008, Army Chief of Staff Major-General Martin Chedondo told soldiers at an army shooting championship in Harare:

The Constitution says the country should be protected by voting and in the 27 June presidential election run-off pitting our defence chief, Cde Robert Mugabe, and Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC-T, we should, therefore, stand behind our Commander-in-Chief. Soldiers are not apolitical. Only mercenaries are apolitical. We have signed and agreed to fight and protect the ruling party’s principles of defending the revolution. If you have other thoughts, then you should remove that uniform.¹²

Major-General Engelbert Rugeje addressing a rally in Masvingo in May 2008 stated:

⁷ SW Radio Africa Zimbabwe news

⁷ Militarisation of Zimbabwe: Does the opposition stand a chance? 24 December 2007

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Great Indaba, Wednesday 03 November 2010, Tsvangirai will not rule; army general

¹² Forcing soldiers to vote for Mugabe Unlawful: Analysts, Sartuday 31 May 2008 <http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/18248-forcing-soldiers-to-vote-for-mugabe-unlawful-analysts.pdf>

This country came through the bullet, not the pencil. Therefore, it will not go by your x of the pencil. We cannot let the efforts of such people as the late Chimombe to liberate this country just go to waste. Today I came here by helicopter with the late Chimombe's body. The next time I will come next week to Jerera, the helicopter will be full of bullets. You know what you did.¹³

Rugeje also promised villagers that on his return after the vote, 'the helicopter will be full of bullets.' In Mudzi in April 2008, soldiers reportedly handed out bullets to villagers and told them:

If you vote for MDC in the presidential run-off election, you have seen the bullets; we have enough for each one of you, so beware.¹⁴

President Mugabe endorsed this view by the military at one of his election rallies and warned:

The war veterans came to me and said, 'President, we can never accept that our country which we won through the barrel of the gun can be taken merely by an 'x' made by a ballpoint pen.' *Zvino ballpoint pen icharwisana ne AK?* [will the pen fight the AK rifle?] Is there going to be a struggle between the two? *Liyekele ukhupikisana lombhobho* [do not argue with a gun].¹⁵

These extremely partisan political statements by the military are a subversion of the will of the people and a vitiation of elections as an expression of democratic choice. Defence Forces Commander, Constantine Chiwenga, in a manner that could unduly influence elections, publicly predicted resounding electoral victory for ZANU-PF presidential candidate, Robert Mugabe when he said:

Our comrade, Defence Forces chief, our leader President Mugabe and comrade-in-arms will romp to victory. We say so because we have no apology to make to any house nigger and puppets.¹⁶ "If the opposition wins the election, I will be the first one to resign from my job and go back to defend my piece of land. I will not let it go...I am giving you an order to vote for the President (Mugabe). Do not be distracted...I will only support the leadership of President Mugabe."¹⁷

Shocking and blatantly partisan as the above statements might be, the military leadership has not stopped there. A more sinister form of direct military interference in the political and electoral affairs of Zimbabwe has been through direct participation by members of the military in perpetrating abuses and in the intimidation of the citizenry.

¹³ Major General Englebert Rugeje, The Financial Gazette (19 June 2008)

¹⁴ Human Rights Watch, 'Bullets for Each of you, State sponsored violence since Zimbabwe's March 29 Elections- Soldiers addressing villagers at meetings in Karoi, Mashonaland West page 3

¹⁵ President Mugabe The Herald (23 June 2008)

¹⁶ General Constantine Chiwenga, head of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, The Herald (23 June 2008)

¹⁷ Paradzai Zimondi- Head of Zimbabwe Prison Services. The Herald (29 February 2008)

3.3 Direct military interference in electoral affairs – political violence and intimidation

Since 2000, members of the military and other security agents, have been implicated in acts of politically motivated violence and intimidation primarily MDC party members and supporters in a vicious repression campaign that included a network of illegal detention centers strewn across the country. In the political violence of 2008 alone, where the military and other ZANU-PF allies were fingered, more than 200 MDC supporters were murdered. In many of the cases the perpetrators who included senior army officers, were named in statements and reports made to the police. However, the police, themselves an extremely politicized institution, have not thoroughly investigated or arrested named perpetrators of the murders and abuses.

Political violence by members of the military, including by uniformed soldiers, was most prominent in the context of the 2008 presidential run-off election campaigns as examined in greater detail in the chapter that follows.

4. The Military's Toxic Role During The 2008 Elections

Although the role of the military was covert and subdued in the lead up to the March 2008 elections, it became decisive and toxic during the presidential runoff election campaign period between April and June 27. The military had overtly taken over and had become the arbiter of Zimbabwe's fate during this period.¹⁸ In early June 2008 MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai noted that the country had witnessed a de facto coup d'etat and was now effectively run by a military junta.¹⁹

In an attempt by the military to reverse Mugabe's defeat by Tsvangirai in the first round of presidential elections, the military effectively overthrew the electoral process and unleashed violence and intimidation on a wide scale. The military emerged at this time as the bedrock and political commissar of ZANU-PF. Following a defeat at the polls by the MDC in March 2008, ZANU-PF's evaluation noted the obvious, that the party structures were virtually non-existent and lacked capacity to mount an effective campaign, hence the strategy to turn to the military for a campaign of coercion. Political scientist Eldred Masunungure noted on the runoff campaign period:

The April to June 2008 interregnum was a militarized moment. A ZANU-PF that had been de-stooled as the ruling party in Parliament was not prepared to be dislodged from State House... In the process, the winds of democratic change were defied; a peaceful, election-centered process of transition away from authoritarianism and towards democracy was interrupted.²⁰

Between April and the June 27 run-off election, the security forces took a central role in violently campaigning for the ZANU-PF candidate, Robert Mugabe. During this period soldiers were deployed in all the ten provinces across the country with the aim to ensure that ZANU-PF wins the presidential election at all costs.

The following are military personnel deployed to lead and run ZANU-PF election campaigns in April 2008:²¹

Harare Metropolitan Province - AVM Michael Karakadzai.

Bulawayo - Province Col. C. Sibanda

Bulawayo Central - Maj. J. Ndlovu and Maj. J. Ncube

Manicaland and Mutare South - Brig. Tarumbwa

Buhera Central - Col. M. Mzilikazi (MID)

¹⁸ Statement by Ms. Tiseke Kasambala, Senior Researcher, Africa Division of Human Rights Watch

¹⁹ Thornycroft, P, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/06/mil-080610-voa08.htm>

²⁰ A Militarized Election The 27 June Presidential Run-off Eldred V. Masunungure

²¹ MDC Information Department (2008)

Buhera North - Maj. L. M. Svosve

Buhera South - Maj. D Muchena

Buhera West - Lt. Col. Kamonge, Major Nhachi

Chimanimani East - Lt. Col Murecherwa

Chimanimani West - Maj. Mabvuu

Headlands - Col. Mutsvunguma

Makoni North - Maj. V. Chisuko

Makoni South - Wing Commander Mandeya

Mutare Central - Lt. Col. Tsodzai, Lt. Col. Sedze, Mandi Chimene

Mutare West - Lt. Col. B. Kashiri

Mutare North - Lt. Col. Chizengwe, Lt. Col. Mazaiwana

Mashonaland Central - Brig.Gen. Shungu

Bindura South - Col. Chipwere

Bindura North - Lt. Col. Parwada

Muzarabani North - Lt. Col. Kazaza

Muzarabani South - Maj. H. Maziri

Rushinga - Col. F Mhonda, Lt. Col. Betheuni

Shamva North - Lt. Col. Dzuda

Shamva South - Makumire

Midlands - AVM Muchena, Brig. Gen. S. B. Moyo, Lt Col. Kuhuni

Chirumanzu South - Maj T. Tsvangirai

Mberengwa East - Col. B. Mavire

Mberengwa West - Maj. T. Marufu

Matebeleland South - AVM Abu Basutu

Beitbridge East - Group Cpt. Mayera, Rtd. Maj. Mbedzi, Lt. Col. B. Moyo

Gwanda South - Maj. J. D. Moyo
Gwanda Central - Maj. B. Tshuma
Matopo North - Lt. Col. Maphosa
Matebeleland North - Brig. Gen. Khumalo
Binga North - Maj. E. S. Matonga
Lupane East - Lt. Col. Mkwanzani
Lupane West - Lt. Col. Mabhena
Tsholotsho - Lt. Col. Mlalazi
Hwange Central - Lt. Col. P. Ndhlovu
Masvingo Province - Maj. Gen. E. A. Rugeje
Rtd. Maj. Gen. Gibson Mashingaidze, Rtd. Brig. General Rangwani
Bikita West - Maj. B. R. Murwira
Chiredzi Central - Col. G. Mashava
Chiredzi West - Maj. E. Gono
Gutu South - Maj. Chimedza (Medical Doctor), AVM Muchena
Masvingo - Lt. Col. Takavingofa
Mwenezi West - Lt. Col. Muchono
Zaka East - Maj. R. Kwenda
Mash West Province - Brig. Gen. Sigauke
Chinhoyi - Col Gwekwerere
Chegutu East - Lt. Colonel W. Tutisa
Hurungwe East - Lt. Col. B. Mahambe
Mhondoro Mubaira - Col. C. T. Gurira
Zvimba North - Cpt. T. Majongwe
Mashonaland East - Brig. Gen. D. Nyikayaramba, Rtd Brig Gen Rungani

Chikomba Central - Lt. Col. Marara

Goromonzi North - Lt. Col. Mudzimba, Maj. F. Mbewe

Marondera Central - Maj. Gen. Chedondo (COSG), Lt. Col. B. Kashiri

Marondera West - Squadron Leader U. Chitauro

Murehwa South - Maj. Gurure

Murehwa North - Lt. Col. Mukurazhizha, Lt. Col. Chinete

A report by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum indicates organized violence and torture increased in association with the various parliamentary by-elections that took place.²² However, there was an absolute increase in organized violence and torture from the middle of the year 2008 as the campaign for the Presidential election gained momentum up to present day. As the violence generally increases, so does the number of cases in which members of the army are implicated as the primary perpetrators.²³ Below are statistics of cases of political violence reported between March 2008 and July 2009 in Zimbabwe with named perpetrators classified by the violator institution. Each number represents individual Zimbabweans tortured, injured, murdered or rendered destitute by arson in the political violence perpetrated by the state during and after the March 2008 'harmonized' and presidential elections.

Table 1²⁴

2008/2009 Perpetrators of Violence by Institution

Violator Institution	Total
Army	424
Central Intelligence Organization	37
ZANU-PF	12 896
Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP)	72
Grand Total	13429

²² Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum; Torture by State Agents in Zimbabwe

²³ Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum; Torture by State Agents in Zimbabwe

²⁴ Table adapted from *Footprints of Abuse*, MDC Violence Statistics

Investigations by international human rights watchdog, Human Rights Watch (HRW), also implicated the military in widespread electoral abuses. In a report, HRW stated that the scale of military attacks exceeds anything seen previously during Zimbabwe's long history of electoral violence. Soldiers carried out scores of attacks in Harare and surrounding townships.²⁵ The military takeover has meant an explosion in the level of violence in Zimbabwe. Names of top military commanders accused of masterminding the ruthless campaign to keep President Robert Mugabe in power include Air Vice Marshal Henry Muchena, Air Commodore Michael Karakadzai, Air Vice Marshal Abu Basutu, Major General Engelbert Rugeje, Retired Major General Gibson Mashingaidze and Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba.

According to the HRW report, witnesses interviewed identified numerous senior military officers as being directly involved in the violence. The report further claimed that documents leaked by disgruntled army officers named 200 of them, each assigned an area to oversee in *Operation Makavhoterapapi? or Operation Where Did You Put Your Vote?*, a campaign to punish those who voted for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), particularly in areas perceived to be traditional ZANU-PF strongholds of Masvingo, Mashonaland, and Manicaland provinces. One victim, quoted in the report described armed soldiers going from house to house in the township of Chitungwiza searching for MDC supporters and beating them:

I did not know my assailants, but they were in army uniform and drove an army truck. They were boasting of being given a three-day assignment to 'bring hell' to the people.²⁶

Army officers have been personally involved in a number of 're-education' meetings at which local residents are forced to renounce opposition and swear allegiance to the ruling party after being beaten and tortured. The Army however continues to deny any involvement in the violence and speaking on this Army deputy public relations officer, Major Alphios Makotore, said:

The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) wishes to raise concerns over articles being published in the print and the electronic media on allegations relating to the alleged political violence, assaults, harassment and robberies perpetrated by men in army uniforms ... the army categorically distances itself and any of its members from such activities.²⁷

The military's meddling in political and civilian affairs has been strongest in Mashonaland East, where soldiers at Joko Army Barracks have taken army drills to villages. In Manicaland province traditional chiefs were summoned to an "indoctrination workshop" where the Brigadier-General Douglas Nyikayaramba told them to support ZANU PF or be deposed from their positions.

²⁵ Sunday Times (2006) 'Zimbabwe soldiers behind wave of heists', Sunday Times, South Africa, 2 July.

²⁶ Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, Monthly Violence Reports, May and June 2008, <http://www.hrforumzim.com/frames/inside_frame_monthly.htm>

²⁷ Zimonline, *Zimbabwe: Army speaks on political violence*, 8 May 2008.

5. Patronage and Military Entrenchment in the National Economy

Through an elaborate patronage system established to reward partisan senior military officials and keep them loyal to ZANU-PF and to President Mugabe, the military has increasingly played central and critical role in directing production and controlling ownership of the means of production.²⁸ The military, through political patronage, has become a significant part of the domestic bourgeoisie class and many top commanders have teamed up with politicians and businessmen to form political and economic interest groups venturing into lucrative businesses such as platinum and gold mining.²⁹ This section examines the extent to which ZANU-PF's political patronage has entrenched the military in national economic affairs and the likely impact on electoral processes.

Retired and serving senior military officers have, in the recent past, been appointed in large numbers to run various state-owned companies. For instance, Retired Colonel Samuel Muvuti was appointed by President Mugabe to head the country's sole buyer and seller of maize, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) before his dismissal in 2008 on corruption allegations in what may have been mere in-fighting within ZANU-PF. President Mugabe in 2004 appointed Retired Major-General Mike Nyambuya provincial governor of Manicaland and later Minister of Energy up to 2007. Previously Retired Colonel Christian Katsande, now the deputy secretary to Cabinet, headed the state-owned oil procurement company – the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCIZM).

Senior military officers were also appointed to lead strategic state institutions including the Zimbabwe Prisons Service (ZPS), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) (under retired Air Commodore Michael Karakadzai) and The Department of National Parks and Wildlife. The increased militarization of the state has led to the military taking control of an expanding range of decisions and actions, from political strategy to the formulation and implementation of agrarian and economic policy.³⁰

Retired Major General Jevan Maseko is Zimbabwe's ambassador to Cuba while retired Brigadier-General Elisha Muzonzini heads the mission in Kenya.³¹ In late 2008 Mupfunhira and most of the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe board were abruptly replaced. Rtd. Col. Nelly Abu Basutu heads the MMCZ while her husband, Air Vice-Marshal Titus Abu Basutu, is deputy to the Air force Chief Perence Shiri.³²

²⁸ Zimbabwe Institute, (June 2008), The security- military Business complex and the transition in Zimbabwe

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Jocelyn Alexander and Blessing Miles Tendi, 'A Tale of Two Elections: Zimbabwe at the Polls in 2008', Concerned Africa Scholars, Bulletin, No. 80, Winter 2008.

³¹ http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33815:mugabe-sets-up-military-state-&catid=69:sunday-top-stories&Itemid=30

³² "Diamonds and clubs. The militarized control of diamonds and power in Zimbabwe," Partnership Africa Canada

In 2009 the ZANU-PF Information and Publicity Minister, Webster Shamu, in violation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) appointed eight senior military officials to boards of media and information state companies – the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ), Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (ZBH), Zimbabwe Newspapers group (ZIMPAPERS), NewZiana, Transmedia and Kingstons.³³

President Mugabe has gone to great lengths to ensure the military's continued loyalty, including distribution of land, housing and prominent political positions to top-ranking military officials and the distribution and production of food.³⁴ Mugabe placed national food distribution and various agriculture programmes directly under the control of the army through control of Grain Marketing Board sales since 2002.³⁵

Senior military officials rank among the top beneficiaries to the violent and chaotic commercial farm invasions that began at the instigation of ZANU-PF in February 2000. An investigation by a Zimbabwean online publication revealed that of the 200 army officers from the rank of Major to Lieutenant General of the Zimbabwe National Army, at least 90% benefited from farm invasions and have farms in most fertile parts of the country.³⁶ The Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander, Constantine Chiwenga owns two farms near Harare including a 1,200-hectare farm known as Chakoma Estates while Air Marshall Perence Shiri owns at least two farms in Marondera and Shamva.³⁷ Retired Army General, Solomon Mujuru and his wife, Vice President, Joyce Mujuru together with their close family members allegedly own at least 25 farms totaling 105,000 Hectares.³⁸

A number of government and independent land audits have found widespread evidence of corrupt allocations and looting of farm equipment by senior politicians and military officers.³⁹ General Mike Nyambuya is implicated in the looting of essential farm equipment at the invaded Kondozi Horticultural Estate in Manicaland, which was one of the biggest agro- export industries in the region before invasion.⁴⁰

Members of the Zimbabwe National Army aligned to ZANU-PF were also implicated in the looting and plundering of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)'s natural resources following Zimbabwe's intervention in the DRC war between August 1998 and July 2003.⁴¹ A United Nations expert panel investigating the plunder of DRC resources found that joint venture companies to exploit resources were formed between 'generals and other top officers in the

³³ allafrica.com/stories/200910020854.html

³⁴ Zimbabwe's security sector (June 2008), www.cfr.org/publication/15793/zimbabwes_security_secctor.html

³⁵ See "Operation Taguta/Sisuthi – Command Agriculture in Zimbabwe: its impact on rural communities in Matebeleland," Solidarity Peace Trust, April 2006.

³⁶ ZimOnline Report

³⁷ Zimonline Report

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Zimbabwe Institute, (June 2008), The security- military Business complex and the transition in Zimbabwe

⁴⁰ "Ministers, party officials accused of looting Kondozi equipment," Zimbabwe Independent, 13 April 2006.

⁴¹ UN Expert DRC Panel Report S/2001/357, 12 April 2001.

Ugandan and Zimbabwean army and other top officials and unsavory politicians in the government of the DRC.’⁴² Among the top military leadership, General Vitalis Zvinwashe (the late), was a major stakeholder in a company called Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (OSLEG) which had lucrative mining contracts in the DRC through a partnership with a firm owned by DRC’s late president, Laurent Kabila.⁴³

Below is a table from the United Nations Expert Panel Report on the DRC war showing companies which exploited minerals in the DRC:

Table 2:⁴⁴

Joint venture company	Alleged Zimbabwean partner	Alleged Congolese partner	Alleged other partners
SENGAMINES – the largest joint venture company formed during the DRC conflict	<p>OSLEG (OPERATION SOVEREIGN LEGITIMACY).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 40% share of the Sengamines venture company. • Controlled by Zimbabwe Defence Industries and Zimbabwean military personnel. • Main contribution was to provide security for the Sengamines mining project • No financial or technical capability to exploit minerals. 	<p>COMIEX CONGO</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 20% share of the Sengamines venture company. • Provision of the resources to be exploited. 	<p>ORYX NATURAL RESOURCES.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 20% share of the Sengamines venture. • Provision of financial and technical capabilities needed for resource exploitation.
ORYX ZIMCON	ZIMCON		ORYX

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ Source: UN Expert DRC Panel Report S/2001/357

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 90% share of the Oryx Zimcon. • Main contribution was the deployment of troops to the Kasai area to protect the project infrastructure from invasion by disgruntled resident communities. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10% share of Oryx Zimcon • Provision of financial and technical expertise for the exploitation of the resources.
COSLEG Largest timber exploration operation in the world.	OSLEG	COMIEX	

The Marange diamond fields in the east of the country are under the tight control of the military who control access to them. However, there is rampant systematic smuggling of Marange diamonds and a thriving illicit trade in the diamonds across the porous Mozambican border. The global blood diamond watchdog to which Zimbabwe belongs, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) has so far failed to end the smuggling or the widespread abuses in Marange diamond fields in which soldiers are implicated. There are genuine fears that diamond revenue from Marange which is not properly accounted for is being used by the military and those aligned to ZANU-PF to build a war chest to fund electoral violence should Zimbabwe go to elections in 2011 as ZANU-PF so much wants.

The companies that were granted licenses to mine diamonds in Marange under unclear circumstances and in violation of Zimbabwe's laws and regulations regarding tender procedures are controlled by senior military officers. The chairperson of Mbada Holdings is former Vice Air Marshal, Robert Mhlanga, who was Mugabe's helicopter pilot for over 20 years and a key state witness in the treason trial against MDC President, Morgan Tsvangirai in 2003 while Canadile Miners' Director is Retired Captain Kurotwi. Several military officers are also listed as shareholders in both companies.⁴⁵

As the table below shows, at least 52 military personnel run key state institutions.

⁴⁵ The Zimbabwean on Sunday Vol 3 No. 11, 21 March 2010.

Table 3⁴⁶

Name	Institution	Position
Lt Gen Michael Nyambuya	Ministry Of Energy	Former Minister & Former Governor Of Manicaland
Brig Ambrose Mutinhiri	Ministry Of Youth Development	Former Minister
Saviour Kasukuwere (Ex-CIO)	Ministry Of Youth Development Empowerment And Indigenization	Current Minister
Lt Col Herbert Nyanhongo	Ministry Of Transport And Communication	Former Deputy Minister
Col Christian Katsande	Ministry Of Industry And International Trade	Former Permanent Secretary Now Deputy Secretary In The OPC
Justin Mupamhanga (Ex CIO)	Ministry Of Energy And Power Development	Current Permanent Secretary
Col Joseph Mhakayakora	Ministry Of Construction	Current Director
Maj Anywhere Mutambudzi	Department Of Information	Current Under Secretary
Brig Elisha Muzonzini	Ministry Of Foreign Affairs	Current Ambassador, Kenya
Rtd Major George Chiweshe	Ministry Of Justice	Current High Court Judge President And Former ZEC Chairman
Maj Gen Edzai Chimonyo	Ministry Of Foreign Affairs	Current Ambassador Tanzania
Rtd Maj Gen Paradzai Zimhondi	Ministry Of Justice	Commissioner Of Prisons
Air Commodore Michael Karakadzai	National Railways Of Zimbabwe (NRZ)	Current General Manager
Brig Gen Douglas Nyikayaramba	National Railways Of Zimbabwe (NRZ)	Former Chairman
Col Godfrey Nhemachena	Commercial Bank Of Zimbabwe (CBZ)	Current General Manager
Rtd Maj Gen Jevan Maseko	Foreign Affairs	Ambassador To Cuba

⁴⁶ Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition research 2011

Rtd Captain Noah Madziva	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA)	Board Chairman
Rtd Brig Gen Agrippa Mutambara	Foreign Affairs	Ambassador To Mozambique
Rtd Col Samuel Muvuti	Grain Marketing Board (GMB)	Former CEO
Rtd Senior Police Commissioner Mandizha	Assistant Albert (GMB)	Current CEO
Rtd Lt Col Nelly Abu Basutu	Minerals Marketing Corporation Of Zimbabwe (MMCZ)	Current Chairperson
Rtd Col Claudius Makova	NEW ZIANA	Board member
Rtd Brig-Gen Collin Moyo	Kingstons	Board member
Rtd Brig-Gen Livingstone Chineka	Transmedia	Board member
Rtd Brig-Gen Felix Muchemwa	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (ZBH)	Board member
Retired Brig-Gen Elasto Madzingira	Broadcasting Authority Of Zimbabwe (BAZ)	Board member
Brigadier-General Kanhangana	Epmarcus Zimbabwe papers (ZIMPAPERS)	Board member
Mr Alexander Kanengoni	Central Intelligence Organization	Senior agent
Rtrd Col Nhemachena	Sport and Recreation Commission Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture	Chief Executive Officer
Karikoga Kaseke	Zimbabwe Tourism Authority (ZTA)	Chief Executive Officer
Sobuza ex-military intelligence officer	Gula-Ndebele Ministry Of Justice	Former Attorney General
Brigadier Gilbert Mashingaidze	The Sports Commission and Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings board.	Former board member
Brig Gen Happyton	CIO	Director

Bonyongwe		
Brig Justin Mujaji	Sport and Recreation Commission	Commissioner
Col Levy Mayihlome	NRZ	Officer
Major Gen Engelbert Rugeje	ZBH	Board member
Brig Gen Sibusiso Moyo	ZBH	Board member
Maj Utuile Silaigwana	ZEC	Spokesperson
Sobusa Gula-Ndebele (former director of military intelligence)	Ministry of justice	Former Attorney General
Col Karikoga Kaseke	Zimbabwe Tourism Authority Chief Executive Officer	
Brig Gen Epmarcus Kananga	Parks and Wildlife	Deputy Director General
Maj Clive Manjengwa	Comptroller and auditor general	Officer
Col Ronnie Mutizhe	Operation Maguta/Sisuthi	Head
Lt Col Arnold Hakata	Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle	Head
Lt Col Reuben Ngwayi	Potraz	Board Member
Wing Commander Kapondoro	Telone	Board Member
Gen Vitalis Zvinavashe	Parliament of Zimbabwe	MP, Gutu (Until March)
Col Makova	Parliament of Zimbabwe	MP, Bikita East (Until March 2008)
Mendy Chimene (CIO)	Parliament Of Zimbabwe	Senator Mutasa Mutare (Until March 2008)
Lt Col Kallisto Gwanetsa	Parliament Of Zimbabwe	MP, Chiredzi South
Vivian Mwashita (CIO)	Parliament Of Zimbabwe	Senator Mbare Hatfield

6. The Military Strategy for the Next Elections

As Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba publicly stated on 27 May 2011, the military demands elections to be held in 2011 and want President Mugabe to win those elections. Nyikayaramba further publicly proclaimed his support for ZANU-PF and that, in line with what numerous army generals have already said, he would never salute any other leader who is not Robert Mugabe or a ZANU-PF cadre, ending with an observation that the army cannot be separated from ZANU-PF.⁴⁷ The military remains entrenched and partisan towards ZANU-PF.

Sources close to ZANU-PF indicate that the military has demanded, and ZANU-PF has agreed, that at least 25% of all legislative seats that ZANU-PF will contest must be reserved for serving or retired military personnel. Vice Air Marshall Henry Muchena has allegedly 'resigned' from the army to take on the role of ZANU-PF director of election campaigns ahead of the next election. The military has so far this year recruited at least 5, 000 soldiers possibly to boost numbers ahead of elections. The deployment of Vice Air Marshall Muchena to the party is to ensure that the military takes direct control of rebuilding party structures from cell, to branch, ward, district, provincial to national level. This strategy will result in a take over of ZANU-PF by the military.

Earlier this year, various civic groups reported deployment of soldiers across the country to direct election campaigns for ZANU-PF and to spearhead violence and intimidation. Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), a civic group with monitors across the country has reported that the army has stepped up its presence in villages while ZANU-PF militia have set up torture camps in some parts of the country – in a chilling reminder to voters of the unprecedented violence that swept across Zimbabwe in 2008.

Military presence in communities has been a source of constant fear for villagers, who anticipate a repeat of the 2008 electoral violence at the hands of the ZANU PF militias and serving members of the army.⁴⁸ Soldiers, police and the militia have harassed residents of Budiriro, Mbare and Chitungwiza; assaulted many of them and destroyed property belonging to perceived MDC supporters.⁴⁹ In January 2011 alone dozens of people were injured when soldiers assaulted villagers in Gutu, a district in the southern Zimbabwean province of Masvingo.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Jason Moyo, *Military's place is 'in the barracks,'* Mail and Guardian, June 3, 2011

⁴⁸ Zimbabwe Peace Project, Summary on politically motivated Human Rights violations, February 2010

⁴⁹ Zimonline, Tuesday 18 January 2011; MDC says military Deployed in rural Areas

⁵⁰ Ibid

Information from military sources is that more than 80, 000 youth militia, war veterans and soldiers will be deployed across the country in an army-led drive to ensure victory for ZANU-PF candidate, President Mugabe in the next elections.⁵¹ A three-month investigation by a Zimbabwean online publication that included interviews with Cabinet ministers, senior military officers and ZANU-PF functionaries, revealed a desperate determination by Zimbabwe's top generals to thwart Tsvangirai, with some even openly bragging that they would topple the Prime Minister should he somehow triumph against the planned violence to emerge the winner of the polls.⁵²

The military plans to deploy senior commanders from either the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) or the Central Intelligence Organization in each of Zimbabwe's 59 districts to coordinate the fight to retain Mugabe in power. The strategy is to unleash enough violence and terror, worse than that seen in the bloody 2008 presidential run-off poll in which at least 200 of Tsvangirai's supporters died and tens of thousands others were left homeless. The move is aimed at ensuring that a thoroughly cowed electorate will, on voting day back Mugabe in enough numbers to save the veteran President from having to face another second round vote.

Vice Air Marshal Henry Muchena will be in charge of the ZANU-PF election campaign, Major Gen. Engelbert Rugeje will be in charge of coordinating Masvingo province. Rugeje is reported to have already started the terror campaign on MDC supporters in the province where he has been blamed for several acts of violence and intimidation. In Mugabe's Mashonaland West home province Brigadier General David Sigauke is tipped to run the brutal campaign to keep the ZANU PF leader in power, while Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba will be in charge of Manicaland province.

Retired Brigadier General Victor Rungani will be in charge of the campaign in Mashonaland East province while vice Air Marshal Abu Basutu will oversee the campaign in Matabeleland South province. Brigadiers General Sibusio Bussie Moyo, Sibangumuzi Khumalo, Etherton Shungu will cover Midlands, Matabeleland North, Mashonaland Central provinces, respectively. Colonel Chris Sibanda and Air Commodore Michael Karakadzai will, respectively, run the campaign to neutralise opposition to Mugabe in the metropolitan provinces of Bulawayo and Harare that are seen as Tsvangirai's strongholds.

Other top soldiers of the ranks of major general, brigadier general or air vice-marshal and assisted by CIO agents will head provincial command centers that will direct the onslaught against the MDC in the provinces. Some of the senior commanders have already started work in the provinces meeting ZANU-PF and traditional leaders to plot the way forward. Junior commanders and hundreds of lower ranking soldiers, some of who have already been deployed in recent months in villages in some districts, will be at the disposal of the senior commanders.

⁵¹ The Zimbabwe Mail, Tuesday 08 February 2011; Military plot to keep ailing Mugabe in power

⁵² Maromo, J., [http://www.zimonline.co.za/ArticleId=6529Military plot to keep Mugabe in power](http://www.zimonline.co.za/ArticleId=6529Military%20plot%20to%20keep%20Mugabe%20in%20power) Wednesday 19 January 2011

7. Power-Sharing Government Failure to Subject the Military to Civilian Control

There has been a degree of acknowledgment within Zimbabwe's political leadership and in SADC that the military has no business making partisan political statements or interfering in electoral affairs. For much of the last decade the MDC has made clear calls that the military's place is in the barracks. In 2002, when military chiefs stated that they would not salute Tsvangirai or allow anyone without liberation war credentials to rule Zimbabwe SADC responded swiftly. The then Chairperson of the SADC Organ Troika on Defence, Politics and Security Cooperation, Dr. Joachim Chissano of Mozambique rebuked the military chiefs and warned them not to engage in politics.⁵³ However, there has been little or no action taken to reign in the military.

At the formation of the power-sharing government in February 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai and his MDC party had correctly identified the military as the main factor blocking democratic change and had demanded that a new body be established in terms of the law to replace the partisan Joint Operations Command (JOC). Although ZANU-PF relented, allowing the National Security Council to be established for the purposes of ensuring civilian control and oversight of all military policies and operations, the body has never really functioned properly. Instead, the JOC has continued to meet regularly, in parallel to formal government structures to decide military policy and operations. Prime Minister Tsvangirai is a member of the defunct National Security Council but not a member of JOC, where virtually all service chiefs on it have vowed not to salute him.

The power-sharing government has dismally failed to ensure accountability of military operations and to restore professionalism, independence and impartiality to the leadership of the military. All attempts to reform the military or the broader security sector have met fierce resistance from ZANU-PF. At its 5th congress in December 2009, ZANU-PF resolved that security sector reform would never be allowed in Zimbabwe. Resolution 6 proclaimed:

Zanu PF, as the Party of revolution and the people's vanguard, shall not allow the Security Forces of Zimbabwe to be the subject of any negotiation for a so called 'security sector reform' that is based on patent misrepresentations of Zimbabwe's heroic history and for the mere purpose of weakening the state so that it can be easily overthrown.⁵⁴

ZANU-PF has continued to resist any attempts to examine the military role in political and electoral affairs despite insistence by the MDC and civil society groups that there can be no lasting solution to the political and governance conflict in Zimbabwe that does not directly address security sector governance reform.

SADC Facilitator for the Zimbabwe peace process, president Zuma and his facilitation team have, together with the GPA negotiating parties in Zimbabwe, placed security sector reform on

⁵³ C Hove, Targets of a dictatorship, *The Standard*, 21 April 2002, p 7.

⁵⁴ 5th ZANU-PF National People's Congress Resolutions, December 9 – 13, 2009.

the agenda of the talks. It is a key aspect of the elections roadmap that SADC and the Zimbabwe political leadership are preparing. However, it remains unclear whether SADC is prepared to put its foot down to ensure security sector reform in Zimbabwe. On the Zimbabwe question, SADC has always faltered at the all-important level of implementation of agreed positions. A full implementation of the letter and spirit of the GPA, for instance, would be sufficient to ensure acceptable levels of security sector reform.

